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A TEXT IS JUST A TEXT
PAUL F. CAMPoS*
In this Article, I will mean by "originalism" the claim that one
should interpret legal texts in general, and the Constitution in
particular, by determining the semantic intentions of the text's
author(s). What I wish to explore here are some of the implica-
tions for originalism of an argument that I have elsewhere called
"strong intentionalism."1 Strong intentionalism asserts that any
interpretation of a text that really is an interpretation of that text is
a reading of that text; that the reading of a text is always the act
of determining the semantic intentions of the text's author; and
that those intentions and the text's semantic meaning are identi-
cal. Discovering what an author intended to say is simply identi-
cal to determining successfully what the author in fact said,
which is to say that in matters of textual interpretation, textual
meaning and authorial intention are the same thing.
After years of considering the nature of interpretation, these
claims seem to me not merely correct, but almost embarrassingly
obvious. Still, I recognize that within the overheated world of aca-
demic arguments regarding constitutional meaning this is not ex-
actly a popular view.2 So let me illustrate the claims with an
example that may strike the reader as rather profane in this con-
stitutionalized context, but whose very profanity has a point. Sup-
pose my wife gives me a grocery list that instantiates a domestic
grundnorm obligating me to purchase the list's contents by that
evening. The list reads in part, "Vegetarian chili-pinto beans,
chili powder, Spanish onions, and various appropriate vegeta-
bles." I stand amid the dazzling plenitude of an American super-
market's produce section and ponder: does this text authorize or
perhaps even require the purchase of tomatoes?
We can, of course, imagine various approaches to this interpre-
tive conundrum. An analytical philosopher, or a Seventh Circuit
judge, might well conclude that the situation called for an objec-
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law
1. For an elaboration of the argument, see Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire:
Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MIN. L. REv. 1065 (1993) [hereinafter
Obscure Objea]; and Paul Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, 4YALuj.L & HumsA. 279
(1992).
2. Indeed, one recent commentator has suggested that "originalism... now has no
serious defenders in the [legal] academy." Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statu-
tory Interpretation An Empirical Analysis, 70 Tx. L. REv. 1073, 1087 (1992).
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ive methodology-that my interpretive search should not be for
the mental contents of my wife's head, but rather for the formal
rules of language she used. A Gadamerian hermeneutician
would probably recommend that I forget about my wife alto-
gether, and engage in a dialogic discourse with the text itself un-
til, ideally, the grocery list and I reach a fusion of interpretive
horizons that allows our respective world views to be reconciled
through an Aristotelian exercise of practical reason.4 Those de-
voted to Rawlsian principles would doubtless insist that I make
the grocery list the best grocery list it can be-that I deploy the
best available political theory sometime before reaching the
checkout counter.
These are all fascinating suggestions, but they share a common
deficiency. It is this: ifI am interpretingwhat this grocery list has to
say about tomatoes, then I am attempting to determine if my wife
meant tomatoes when she wrote "various appropriate vegeta-
bles," and nothing more. Contrary to the claims of linguistic for-
malists, hermeneuticians, deconstructionists, and theoretically-
minded law professors, there is nothing particularly mysterious
or metaphysically challenging about this activity. It is called
"reading," and indeed every author of every text assumes implic-
itly that it is possible. Thus ifI am asking a question about a text's
meaning, I am asking what the author of the text meant to say,
for the simple reason that that is the only meaning the text has
or could have.
Now as the examples above illustrate, there are literally an infi-
nite number of other sorts of questions that one can ask about a
text. We can ask, what should this text mean? Or, what would this
text mean if it had been written by someone else? Or, what would
it mean if its author knew what we know, or believed what we
believe? And so forth. But these are not questions about what the
text means. They are questions about what the text does not
mean. They are, in a word, counterfactuals. They are not ques-
tions about textual interpretation, but rather questions about an-
other text-a text that does not exist unless and until it is
brought into being by some activity that itself is not
interpretation.
3. Cf. In re Sindair 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (describing
the use of such a search as an appropriate method of interpreting legislative history).
4. See Obscure Object supra note 1, at 1071-72.
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So in a descriptive sense, originalism is absolutely correct. In-
deed, it is not merely that legal actors should interpret legal texts
by attempting to determine the intentions of the texts' authors-
strong intentionalism asserts that the interpreters of any kind of
text cannot possibly be doing anything else.5 But before defend-
ers of legal originalism declare total intellectual victory, I would
like to note three important limitations to the strong intentional-
ist position.
First, originalism properly understood has no methodological
value. The insight that the meaning of a text is identical to its
author's intention does not help the interpreter determine how
to go about ascertaining the meaning of any particular text.
Whatever methods the interpreter may choose to employ-con-
sulting the author, reviewing certain documents, investigating
contemporaneous uses of the same terms-may or may not
prove helpful in any particular interpretive situation. That James
Madison or John Bingham thought or did not think something
concerning some constitutional provision might be useful to
know; on the other hand, such information could turn out to be
quite misleading. Such is the nature of all historical, which is to
say all empirical, inquiry. How then can we be certain what a con-
stitutional provision, or any other text, actually means? The an-
swer, of course, is that we cannot. We can, however, be confident
enough in our interpretations-close enough, that is, for our
practical interpretive purposes.
Second, an originalist understanding of what interpretation
must be is not itself a theory of political obligation. The claim
that legal actors should interpret texts, as opposed to deploying
them in some other fashion, is a normative claim about which
originalism in the descriptive sense has nothing to say. Now it
seems to me that a great deal of the debate concerning constitu-
tional interpretation, both in and out of the academy, tends to
degenerate into a sort of argument by definitional fiat, in which
each faction shouts at the top of its collective voice that its pre-
ferred approach to the controversy is nothing less than "law,"
while characterizing its opponents' claims as politically moti-
vated, frighteningly radical, or fundamentally unprincipled-
5. As Stanley Fish puts it, "there is only one style of interpretation - the intentional
style - and ... one is engaging in it even when one is not self-consciously paying 'atten-
tion to intention.'" Stanley Fish, Play of Sudfaces: Theoy and the Law, in LEGAL HERMENEU-
Tics: HISTORy, THEORY, Am PRAcrIE 297, 299 (1992).
No. 2]
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and therefore "lawless."6 Given that in our present legal culture
it is becoming extremely difficult to make out what someone
does or does not mean when he claims that something is "law,"
these arguments have about them a rich air of unreality. In such
a confused interpretive situation pointing out that a text only
means what its author meant by it can have, perhaps, some
clarificatory value; it cannot, however, resolve debates that in the
end have very little to do with questions of textual interpretation.
Third, those who advocate a normative originalism need to
keep in mind that a text is just a text-which is to say that a text's
limitations are inevitably and precisely those of its author. Con-
sider again my wife's hypothetical grocery list. Obviously, a gro-
cery list is not a constitution. But in an important sense, a
constitution-at least our Constitution-is not not a grocery list.
If we dispense with various forms of what my colleague Steve
Smith has termed constitutional idolatry, the Constitution is in
most ways a fairly prosaic text.7 Despite the obscurantist theology
of modem judicial review, the Constitution's text is not full of
nebulous generalities calling out for interpretive solidification at
the hands of berobedjurisprudential philosophers and their aca-
demic hangers-on. In comparative literary terms it is in many
ways a thoroughly quotidian document, full of specific com-
promises addressed to the local politics of various quite particu-
larized disputes. Given this, originalists must ask themselves what
sort of semantic artifact would even be capable of serving as the
enabling entity for an interpretive practice whereby a centuries-
old text would actually provide answers to the contingent contro-
versies of the present moment. I will conclude by speculating on
that very question.
In the second volume of his epic fantasy The Lord of the Rings,
the philologist J.R.R. Tolkien imagines a race of tree-like crea-
tures called Ents. The Ents are a sort of animated forest, and
their language reflects centuries of unhurried sylvan contempla-
tion. In the following passage, their leader Treebeard gives some
hint of its form:
6. Compare Ronald Dworkin, The Bo* Nomination, N.Y. Rzv. Boos, Aug. 13, 1987, at 3,
6-10 (arguing that Bork's view of original intent is inconsistent and that Bork's "constitu-
tional philosophy is empty... no philosophy at all") with ROaRT H. BORK, THE TMVnNG
OF AMERICA: THE POL-riC SEaUcrON OF THE LAw 176-78 (1990) (arguing that the phi-
losophy of original understanding requires a political neutrality that would mark the end
of liberal outcomes "legislated [by the Court] in the name of the Constitution")
7. See Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Intepretation, 79 VA. L. REV. 583 (1993).
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'I am not going to tell you my name, not yet at any rate.... For
one thing it would take a long while: my name is growing all
the time, and I've lived a very long, long time; so my name is
like a story. Real names tell you the story of the things they
belong to in my language, in the Old Entish as you might say.
It is a lovely language, but it takes a very long time to say any-
thing in it, because we do not say anything in it, unless it is
worth taking a long time to say, and to listen to.
... 'Let us leave this-did you say what you call it?'
'Hill?' suggested Pippen....
Treebeard repeated the word thoughtfully. 'HilL Yes, that
was it. But it is a hasty word for a thing that has stood here ever
since this part of the world was shaped ....8
A similar semantic idea is explored by several of the early mod-
em philosophers, including Descartes, Leibnitz, and Locke.
These thinkers imagined the possibility of a comprehensive ana-
lytical language that would organize and contain nothing less
than all human thought Perhaps the most ambitious of these
grand linguistic schemes was developed by the now-forgotten
English polymathJohn Wilkins.9 Wilkins's procedure involved di-
viding the universe into forty categories, called classes. These in
turn were subdivisible into differences, which were themselves di-
vided into species. Each class was then assigned a monosyllable
consisting of two letters; each difference was represented by a
consonant, and each species by a vowel. Thus de means element;
deb is the first of the elements, which is of course fire; while deba
is a portion of that element, the flame. As Jorge Luis Borges
notes:
The word salmon does not tell us anything about the object it
represents; 'zana,' the corresponding word [in Wilkins's
scheme] defines (for the person versed in the forty categories
and the classes of those categories) a scaly river fish with red-
dish flesh.' 0
Characteristically, Borges adds that "a language in which the
name of each being would indicate all the details of its destiny,
past and future, is not inconceivable.""
8. J.R.R. ToLum, Tim TWo TowERs 68-69 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1954).
9. SeeJoHN WiLmis, AN ESSAY TOWARs A REAL CHARACrER AND A PHILOSOPHIcAL LA.N-
GUAGE (1668).
10. Jorge L. Borges, The Analytical Language of John Wikhns, in BORGES, A RiADER: A
SEaEcrioN FROM THE Wsa-nrs OFJoRGE Luis BoRGEs 141, 143 (Emir R. Monegal & Alas-
tair Reid eds., 1981).
11. Id.
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Perhaps inspired by this example, Borges himself exploited the
idea of a total language in several of his labyrinthine fables, most
notably in the tale Funes the Memorious, in which a Uruguayan
peasant boy, Ireneo Funes, suffers a crippling accident that leaves
him-inhuman, godlike-with an absolutely perfect memory.
He knew by heart the forms of the southern clouds at dawn
on the 30th of April, 1882, and could compare them in his
memory with the mottled streaks on a book in Spanish bind-
ing he had seen only once and with the outlines of the foam
raised by an oar in the Rio Negro the night before the Quebra-
cho uprising .... Locke in the seventeenth century, postulated
(and rejected) an impossible language in which each individ-
ual thing, each stone, each bird, each branch, would have its
own name; Funes once projected an analogous language, but
discarded it because it seemed too general to him, too ambig-
uous. In fact, Funes remembered not only every leaf of every
tree of every wood, but also every one of the times he had
perceived or imagined it .... He was... almost incapable of
ideas of a general, Platonic sort. Not only was it difficult for
him to comprehend that the generic symbol dog embraces so
many unlike individuals of diverse size and form; it bothered
him that the dog at three fourteen (seen from the side)
should have the same name as the dog at three fifteen (seen
from the front).12
Behind each of these visions of a total semantic code is an ap-
preciation of the absurd pretentions of our own fallible lan-
guages. We should remember that to name something is in some
sense to claim to know what it is-to know its significance. In-
deed, these dreams of verbal utopias remind us that to signify
accurately would require that we know, like Adam in his prelap-
sarian garden, what our universe is-for every thing we name
implies the otherness and thus the identity of everything else
from which the act of signification distinguishes the thing
signified.
If we believe that an accurate interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's text vindicates anything remotely resembling the results of
the modem practice ofjudicial review, we must assume that the
object of interpretation is written in some hermetic code that
mimics the total languages in which divinities undoubtedly con-
verse. Perhaps those who believe themselves committed both to a
thoroughgoing originalism and to what is called "constitutional
12. Jorge L. Borges, Funes the Memorious, in I.4awmimrs, SELECTED STORIES & OTHER
WRITINGS 59, 63, 65 (Donald A. Yates &James E. Irby eds., 1964).
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law" should try to imagine how successful we would be if it were
our task to produce a text that would do what we demand of the
Constitution, or more precisely, of its problematic authors.
Could we generate a legal code that would in fact answer
whatever unimaginable questions the inhabitants of that undis-
covered country which is the Twenty-Third Century might ask of
it? To believe that our constitutional text answers such questions
today is to assert that its omniscient authors foresaw analogous
complexities, and that they encoded within that text's capacious
signifiers a secret discourse revealing all they knew-and all we
need to know-of what was past, or passing, or to come.

